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INTRODUCTION 
A systematic approach has been 
developed to determine benchmark biases 
and apply those biases to code results to 
meet the requirements of DOE Order 
* 5480.24 regarding docmMing critii;aIiv 
safety margins. Previously;. validation ofthe 
code against experimental benchmark -to 
prove reasonable agreement was sufficient. 
However, DOE Order 5480.24 requires 
contractors to adhere to the requirements of 
ANSUANS-8.1 and establish subcritical 
margins. 
A method was developed to incorporate 
biases and uncertainties fiom benchmark 
calculations into a kff value; with a 
quantifiable uncertainty. The method 
produces a 95% confidence level in both the 
kcr value of the scenario modeled and the 
distribution of the 4~ calculated by the 
Monte Carlo code. Application of the 
method to a group of benchmarks modeled 
using the KENO-Va code and the SCALE 
27 group cross sections is also presented. 
METElODOLOGY 
Criticality safety calculations must be 
adequately benchmarked for the computer 
code used yith representative experiments. 
Typically a large nknber of experiments is 
needed to establish a bias and uncertainty. 
TheNmethod described here can use a 
miniihn of ten benchmarks and provide 
statistically significant results (see Equation 
4). If ten representative benchmarks, (Le. 
similar fuel and form, enrichment, 
c I C  -. 
reflector, etc) can not be found, the entire 
suite of benchmarks is used. In this case, 
the standard deviation of all of the 
benchmarks is greater than the standard 
deviation of ten similar benchmarks. 
Therefore, conservatism is built into the 
95%/95% confidence when the entire 
library'is used. The library of benchmarks 
should be expanded as the need arises to 
include at least two benchmarks that are 
respresentative of the scenario or portions of 
the scenario (i.e. same reflector material) 
being modeled. 
The benchmark library should fxst be 
tested to ensure it represents a normal 
distribution. A chi-squared test is acceptable 
but requires a minimum of 50 samples. For 
smaller libraries, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(KS) test as described in Reference: 1 is 
applicable. Failure of this test indicates that 
the benchmarks should be reviewed for 
accuracy before establishing a bias. ;If a 
normal set of representative benchmarks can 
not be found, the entire set must be used. 
Using the statistical analysis outlined 
below, the computed kff for a criticality 
safety calculation can be updated to account 
for the error in the code to the desired 
codidence level. The method used as 
outlined below accounts for the uncertainty 
in both the mean and the standard deviation 
of the calculation. The value is dependent 
on the number of benchmark cases modeled 
and the resulting statistics in addition to the 
result of the calculation. First, the code bias, 
I 
c 
bb, for the selected benchmarks is calculated 
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where Di is the difference between the 
measured k, and the value of k,, calculated 
by the code and Nb is the number of 
benchmark experiments modeled. The 
standard deviation, ob, is given by 
. .  .. (2) Z(bb-DJ2 .- - .  :.. - :  . _  N,-l 
Finally, the expression for the 95%/95% 
confidence kK, termed J&5,g5, is 
(3) 
where k, and 0, are the 4, and standard 
deviation outputted by the code, aqd U is the 
uncertainty multiplier for the required 
confidences. The standard deviations are 
hcluded as the sum of the squares as they 
result from independent events. q, is a 
function of the experimental errors and 
cross-section errors in modeling the 
benchmark. a,, on the other hand, results 
from the statistical uncertainty in .neutron 
tracking by the code. 
The uncertainty multiplier, U, is a 
function of, the number of degrees of 
freedom, df, of the sets of samples as 
determined using the following equation [2]: 
(4) 
where N, is the number of stages used to 
calculate the standard deviation outputted by 
the code. In the case of the KENO code, N, 
is the number of generations run. From df, 
U is found using the tables for one sided 
tolerance limit factors for a normal 
distribution given in Reference 3. Values of 
U are qvailable for confidence levels of 75% 
to 99.999% in the standard deviation and a 
95% confidence level in the mean. Using an 
uncertainty factor with 95% confidence in 
the standard deviation allows one to state 
that at least 95% of the normal population is 
less than the 1(95/95 value calculated with 95% 
confidence, hence the term Kgs,95. Notice as 
more benchmarks are included, the larger 
value of Nb increases df which reduces the 
value of U and subsequently the value of 
I(95/95. This fact was used in the decision to 
require a minimum of 10 benchmarks for 
application of this method. 
As an example, the eleven benchmarks 
[3,4,5] shown in Table I were used to 
characterize the SCALE 27 group cross 
sections and codes for the modeling of N 
reactor fuel assemblies. The N reactor 
assemblies consist of uranium metal fuel 
with an enrichment varying from 0.947 wt% 
to 1.25 wt% and are of double annular 
design. The goal of the analysis was to 
identify criticality safety storage limits for 
the inner annular fuel rod alone, the outer 
annular fuel rod alone, and the assembly 
consisting of the two concentric rods 
together. The worst case model of the fuel 
rods used consists of full water moderation 
and reflection at optimum pitch. The 
benchmarks modeled to create the code bias 
c 
contain single annular uranium metal fuel 
rods with enrichments from 0.947 wt% to 
2.1 wt% with full water moderation and 
reflection at various pitches. Therefore, all 
of these benchmarks are very representative 
of the N reactor fuel and the set provides a 
good basis for creating a code bias. 
The following calculational sequence was 
employed. First NITAWL was used to 
calculate the resonance data using the 
SCALE 27 group cross sections. Next 
XSDWM-S was used to smear the fuel pin 
and surrounding water cross-sections (i.e. 
flux weight the cross-sections). Finally the 
smeared fuel pins were modeled in KENO- 
Va as a cylinder of the appropriate size for 
the number of rods. This method was used 
for both the benchmark and the limiting 
cases. 
As shown by the benchmark results in 
Table I, the code on average underpredicts 
the value of keff for the annular fuel tubes.. 
Therefore a calculated ken less than 0.98 is 
not necessarily subcritical. However, by 
applying the method outlined above to the 
calculated values, the degree of conservatism 
is easibly quantified with a 95% confidence 
level. 
The following constants were calculated 
for these annular fuel benchmarks. To 
determine the cod’e bias, Di was first found 
by subtracting the calculated value of ken 
from the measured value of kff as shown in 
Table I. Then the code bias was found from 
Equation 1 , 
(5) 
The standard deviation was calculated from 
Equation 2 
-7 
and the variance is given by 
0: =( 0.0 1 32)2 =1.742e -4 (7) 
The code statistics were applied to the N 
reactor fuel results as the following example 
using a Mark IA inner fuel rod calculation 
illustrates. KENO-Va calculated a kff of 
0.923 i 0.00071 for two hundred Mark 1A 
inner rods at optimum pitch with full water 
reflection. To apply the bias, df must first 







The KENO run modeled 100 generations; 
thus this value is used for N,. To add 
conservatism, the value of df is always 
rounded down because a lower degree of 
freedom results in a higher uncertainty. The 
corresponding value of U as read fiom the 
table in Reference 3 for a df of 10 is 2.815. 
Thus bSDs for a 95% confidence level in 
both the mean and the standard deviation is 




Therefore, in accordance with DOE Order 
5480.24, the user can state that there is a 
095% probability that the subcritical margin 
is 225 mk with a 95% confidence level. 
In addition to the set of benchmarks 
outlined above, berichmarkssets for a variety 
of applications including plutonium systems, 
homogeneous uranium systems, and mixed 
oxide systems were compiled. Therefore 
whenever a criticality calculation is 
performed in the future,- representative 
benchmarks can be chosen 'off the shelf 
with no need to run new benchmarks. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the Method 'desMbed 
provides an excellent tool for combining 
benchmark results with calculated values to 
account for calculational biases in a 
computer code for a specific problem. With 
the use of an adequate number of 
representative benchmarks, the resulting 
&,,95 stands alone as a measure of the safety 
of the system. The method allows the user 
to state the margin of subcriticality and the 
confidence in the value in order to comply 
with DOE Order 5480.24. 
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4.70 0.973 0.00081 0.0265 
5.08 0.980 0.00078 0.0198 
5.33 . 0.984 0.00070 0.0164 
5.59 0.985 0.00074 0.0153 
6.10 0.987 0.00068 0.5135 
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6.20 0.958 0.00083 0.0423 
7.1 1 0,991 0.00091 0.0087 
7.87 1.004 0.00089 0.0035 
8.64 1.006 0.00084 0.0060 
Total 0.1638 
7.501E-4 
3.884E-5 
3.397E-4 
4.377E-4 
1.731E-3 
